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Abstract 
 The rapid informatization of the world which has started since the beginning  of 90s 
led to the growing state interdependence from cyberspace. The Internet has become  crucial to 
the society, economy, military of contemporary country. This situation became a new 
challenge for the national security and more and more often the term cyberwar has been used. 
Despite the fact that this phenomenon is not clearly defined the massive cyberattack on 
countries took place in the past. 
 The main aim of this article is to examine three cases of these attacks: on Estonia in 
2007, on Georgia in 2008 and on Kyrygysytan 2009 and to try finding similarities and 
differences  and answer the question who carried out these strikes and why. In order to do it 
the following factors will be analyzed: the political background of these countries and the 
relation with the neighbours, the time and scale of attacks and effect of them. In conclusion 
the article tries to find the most difficult answer who was a perpetrator. The three hypotheses 
were presented with evaluation of probability of them.   
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Growing significance of cyberspace for countries  
 Since the beginning of 90s the information revolution has begun and the Internet- a 
tool created to allow communication between universities in the United States, became global. 
It led to the enormous and rapid increase in number of Internet Users. In 1995 when the 
measurement started it was 36 million people who accessed to the Internet  now this number 
amounts to approximately 3 billion.1  
 The rapid development of the Internet caused that cyberspace became more and more 
used by the private companies, authorities of states and average people. A lot of elements of 
daily life was transferred into the virtual world and things like banking online, voting online 
became normal in many countries. Also the elements of state critical infrastructure was 
connected to the Internet and used advantage of it. The information revolution could not omit 
the military. It allowed them to the access to information in real time. The rapid 
informatization of the world has changed literally every aspect of life. 
 The wide spreading of the Internet significantly influences the national security of the 
states. The cyberspace became a tempting place for the activity of different hackers, groups of 
cybergangs and cybercriminal and cyberarmies of the countries. The architecture of 
cyberspace is very favorable for the assailants because when it was created the security was 
not among priorities. There are certain features which can ease carrying out strike. The 
potential aggressor is very difficult to trace. Secondly, conducting the hostiles acts in 
cyberspace is relatively cheap and required only computer with the access to the Internet and 
hacking skills. The third aspect is  time of attack which can be conducted from every corner of 
the world in seconds. These factors cause that growing informatization of the world led to 
increasing hostile actions in cyberspace. 
 In 90s there were mainly attacks carried out by individual hackers who wanted to test 
its skills and they treated these like a hobby. However, more and more experts start to predict 
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a forthcoming cyberwar. John Arquilla and David Ronfeld from The American think thank 
RAND published the “Cyberwar is coming” where they present the theoretical model of 
potential conflict in cyberspace.2 When the publication was created it sounded as a science-
fiction plot but in 21st century the probability that depicted scenarios will happen  significantly 
has rose up. The cases of Estonia, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan could not be unanimously 
described as a cyberwar because there is no clear definition of this phenomenon but they 
represent the examples of massive cyberattacks against the state.      
 
Estonia   
 Estonia is one of the Baltic Republics which was incorporated to the Soviet Union in 
1940. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union Estonia regained independence and started the 
process of rapid economic, political and social reforms. It joined the European Union and 
NATO in order to ensure own security. Estonian authorities have seen the gravest threat in 
Russia and integration with Western structures was the method to overcome it.3 One of the 
main strife in bilateral relations was the problem of Russian minority in Estonia which 
amounts to 26 % of society.4 
 In April 2007 the tensions with Russia significantly increased due to the decision of 
Estonian capital city – Tallinn authorities, to remove the statue of Bronze Soldier of Tallinn 
which commemorated the Soviet soldiers who had liberated Estonia. For the Estonians it was 
a symbol of oppression. For Russians it meant the destroying of the cultural heritage and the 
lack of respect for the Red Army which fought against Nazi Germans during II World War.5 
After the movement of the Bronze Statue the relationships between Estonia and Russia 
became very tensed. Kremlin accused Tallinn authorities of breaking human laws and 
demanded resignation of the Estonian Prime Minister6. Simultaneously, the serious riots on 
the streets between the police and Russian minority in Estonia7, the protests in front of 
Estonian Embassy in Moscow8 and the massive cyberattacks campaign erupted. 
  Estonia has been highly dependent on the Internet. Almost the whole country was 
covered by the WiFi Internet, all Government services were available online, 86 % of 
Estonian populations did banking online. In 2007 there was opportunity to vote electronically 
and 5,5 % of voters did it.9  
 On 26 April the growing volume of the cyberattacks was noticed and this day is 
commonly recognized as the beginning of massive cyberattack. The peak of the attack took 
place on May 9. Since that date the number of hostile acts started to decrease. On May 11 the 
Paid botnets10  activity ended, the last attack took place on May 23.11 
 The DDoS12 attack successfully targeted the websites of all government ministries, 
two major banks, and several political parties. Hackers were even able to disable the 
parliamentary email server and disabled  the credits cards and automatic teller machines.13 
One of the Estonian banks which was a victim of cyberattack estimated losses around $ 1 
million in damages.14 However, when the ultimately losses were evaluated surprisingly the 
damages done by cyberattacks were relatively low.15 
 The majority of these attacks were DDoS attacks. It was not a completely new 
technique, in past there were a lot of incidents using DDoS.16 However, in Estonia there was 
an interesting composition of mixing attacks from professional hackers probably from the 
Russian Business Network17 who used botnets and so called patriotic hackers– individual 
young users of computers who were outraged by Tallinn authorities decision to move the 
statue.18 There was a special Russian language forum with the downloaded tools  and 
instructions how to carry out cyberattacks19.  
 Despite the initial surprise Estonia was able to organize defense quickly  and with help 
of allies overcome the dangers. Germany, Israel, Slovenia and Finland provided assistance to 
restore normal networks operations. NATO Computer Emergency Response Team also helped 
Estonia. 
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 Cyberattack on Estonia in 2007 was widespread reflected in media and called the first 
cyberwar in history. It showed how the new technology could be used to attack a modern 
country. The attack which came from Russia - most of the DDoS attacks were addressed from 
Russian IP addresses. A lot of attackers used computers from Estonia – it was the Russian 
minority. Even though, the European Commision and NATO technical experts did not find 
any evidence that this attack was perpetrated by Russian authorities, these attacks was very 
favorable to Kremlin.20 It seems even more probable when the member of youth Russian 
organization NASI affiliated with the ruling party of Vladimir Putin confessed that he stood 
behind attacks.21  
 The presumable aims of the cyberattacks were to try to influence Tallinn authorities to 
withdrawn from its decision of removing the monument. Second was to test Russian cyber 
warfare capabilities and look for the reaction of NATO when one of the members of this 
organization is attacked in new domain. The third one was linked with the fact that Estonian 
society is dependent on the Internet. Cyberattacks  were carried out to show that both NATO 
and EU would not defend Estonian society from the Russian attack and the Russian did not 
need tanks to inflict damages to Estonia. All political targets were not achieved, the 
monument was removed and Estonia became a leader on cybersecurity field. The NATO have 
sped up its cyberdefence projects and created Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence located near Tallinn. 
   
Georgia  
 Georgia regained its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unlikely as 
others post soviet republic this country had a long history and the strong national 
consciousness. From the beginning of 90s this country looked for integration with West.22 
This trend was strengthened after 2003 when the Rose Revolution23 erupted and the current 
president Eduard Shevardnadze was overthrown. The new elected president Micheil 
Saakashvili engaged into integration with Western Structures and also tried to reintegrate the 
breakaways Georgian provinces – South Ossetia24 and Abkhazia.25 His attempts evoked a 
strong reaction from Russia which led to the war in 2008.26  
 This conflict which started on 7 August and lasted for 5 days was a remainder of 
classical states versus states wars which seems to be forgotten in the 21st century. Despite the 
fact, that the war was classical and the behaving of the armies on battlefield reminds the 20 
century, one aspect of it was a complete novelty. It was the first war which took place in the 
air, on the ground, on the sea and in new domain – cyberspace.  
 The first cyberattacks took place months before the outbreak of war. On 19 July, the 
security firm informed about the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against the 
Georgian websites. The similar scenario with the attacks on bigger scale was repeated on 8 
August and coincided with the Russian troops entering the South Ossetia. The attack carried 
out by Russian hackers could be shared into two phases. In the first phase attacking hackers 
focused mainly on Georgian news and government websites. Russians used botnets  to 
conduct  mainly brute DDoS attacks. The Georgian networks were more vulnerable to attack 
than the Estonian ones.27  In second phase of the cyberattacks the list of targets embraced 
financial institutions, businesses, educational institutions, Western media and a Georgian 
hackers website. Beside the DDoS attack there were also web defacement28 operations done 
with using an SQL injection29 and the massive spamming on public email in order to clog 
them. During the second phase of operation a lot of patriotic hackers joined campaign against 
Georgia30. Till 10 August the majority of the Georgian governmental Web sites were 
inoperative and Georgian Government was unable to communicate with the world using the 
Internet. Instead of normal content on the Georgian President website, there were images 
depicted M. Saakashvili as Hitler31. Also banks did not function in Georgia as well as the cell-
phones32. Despite the fact that hacker were able to target Supervisory Control and Data 
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Acquisition (SCADA)33 systems these kinds of attack were not observed. According to  
Captain Paulo Shakarian from the United States Army it means that Russian hackers tested 
their skills and ability to carry out limited attack. In future, in potential attacks against NATO 
countries attack on SCADA system could evoke the article V and the response could be more 
serious.34   
 The attacks came from the territory of Russia and were the mixture of professional 
acts carried out by using the botnets and the attacks conducted by patriotic hackers who 
similarly like in Estonia case could find information and programs on the special forums.35 
There was a list of prioritized targets and the information about potential vulnerabilities and 
how to evade Georgian blockade on Internet connections from Russia. The center of this 
information campaign was  the website StopGeorgia.ru where the amateurs could find tools to 
carry out the DDoS attacks.36 Similarly like in Estonia case  experts did not find a clear 
direction between the Russian authorities and attack but the experts from Project Grey Goose 
- a voluntary organization consisted of 100 volunteers stated that “the level of advance 
preparation and reconnaissance strongly suggests that Russian hackers were primed for the 
assault by officials within the Russian government”.37 However, it seems that again Russian 
Business Network was engaged into attacks. Analysis of the different experts pointed out 
Alexandr A. Boykov a  RBN operative and Andrey Smirnov a spammer from Saint Petersburg 
as two main perpetrators of cyberattack on Georgia. They represented vast knowledge and 
experience in carrying out hostile acts in cyberspace.38  
 There were two other interesting aspects of the cyberattack on Georgia. First one is the 
coordination of the conventional strikes and cyberattack which are mostly unseen. 
Nevertheless, there are two situations which could indicate the cooperation between classical 
and cyber forces. First one was the fact that conventional strikes omitted attacking  the media 
and communication facility leaving these targets for cyberattacks. The second example was an 
attack on websites of renting diesel-powered electric generators in order to support 
conventional strike against Georgian electrical infrastructure.39 The second interesting aspect 
is the preparation of the cyber tools, instruction, special websites to carry out the strikes. It can 
indicate that Russia was preparing this war for longer time. The access to tool available to 
Russians and the instructions how to use them could not be prepared in one day.40 
 The Georgian authorities in the wake of massive disruption of Internet websites firstly 
tried to filter Russian IP addresses but the Russian very quickly changed their tactic and used 
non-Russian servers.41 Later Georgian authorities asked the allies the United States, Poland 
and Estonia for help. Georgians servers were relocated.42  
 The cyberattack on Georgia was a manifestation of information warfare aimed at 
cutting off Georgian authorities and society from any news. The perpetrators of it pursued to 
two main aims. First one was to demonstrate to the whole world the fragility of Saakashvili 
regime who lost control over the own state and Georgia in wake of Russian invasion had been 
paralyzed. Second one was addressed to Georgian society to cut them off from any 
information and present own propaganda in order to spread chaos and disinformation to 
undermine their morale and faith in government. Third target is linked with the second phase 
of attacks directed against the economic system. It was probably aimed to inflict serious 
damages for economic development of Georgia and persuade people to stop supporting 
Saakashvili. All aims were not achieved mainly because of the aid from allies. The 
government websites were restored and the Georgian society had an access to information and 
the United States  promised financial help for Georgian government.43  
 
Kyrygistan 
 The third country which suffered from massive cyberattacks was Kyrgyzstan. This 
republic located in the Central Asia was a part of the Soviet Union. After dissolution of it in 
1991 Kyrygyzstan became a member of Commonwealth of Independence States. This 
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relatively small country with about 77 000 meteres square and 5 millions of people was a 
close ally of the Russia. This situation changed in 2005 when the Tulip Revolution  overthrew 
long term President Askar Akayev. The new president was more pragmatic and tried to 
balance between the United States and Russia.44 
 The cyberattack took place in January 2009 when the heated debate rolled over the 
country about the future of American air force base in Manas. The strongest protests  against 
closing the base came from the opposition. Manas base was established after the 11/09 when 
the United States prepared to attack Afghanistan. Kyrygystan supported George Walker Bush 
Administration in these efforts and agreed on the American Base on its own territory. In 2005 
Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev during the meeting with Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice admitted that the American and NATO forces could use base till the 
situation in Afghanistan would be stable.45 At the beginning of 2009 there was a discussion 
about the prolonging the renting of the base or closing it. This second option was supported 
by Russian government which proposed 300 million USD loan and 1.7 mld of investments in 
energy sector in order to influence Kyrygystan government to undertake the favorable 
decision.46 In February 2009 Bakiyev announced that he would ask Americans to leave the 
base.47 However, after the long negotiations the agreement between the Kyrygystan 
authorities and the United States were dealt in June 2009. According to the new agreement the 
cost for renting rose up from 16 million USD to 60 million USD and additionally, the United 
States promised additional investments.48    
 The attacks, which started on 18 January 2009 took place  for 2 weeks. Attackers 
successfully disrupted 3 from 4 Internet providers service (IPS) included the two mains 
Kyrgyzstan  IPS (www.domain.kg, www.ns.kg). They used massive DDoS attacks. Because 
there are only 4 IPS in in Kyrygystan, the majority of Internet services collapsed.49 It was 
impossible to send email or enter to certain websties50and also using mobile phones was 
hindered because of cyberattack. Almost 80% of Internet traffic was offline. Nevertheless, the 
average citizens of Kyrygystan did not suffer because of the cyberattack from a simple reason. 
Only a small number of Kyrgyz had an Internet access.51 However, it is important to stress 
that the opposition to the leading president was interdependent on the Internet.52        
 The IP traffic was traced backed to Russian servers where the most of DDoS traffic 
was generated53. These servers were commonly used to the cybercriminals activity as well as 
to attack Estonia and Georgia. The IP address and networks were associated with the groups 
responsible for previous attacks in 2007 and 2008. Also the two groups which led them were 
similar to these from 2008.54  The high probability existed that behind these attacks stood the 
RBN. The probable scenario looked that Russian officials hired hackers from RBN to carry 
out the massive cyberattacks.55 
 The attacks were probably a part of Russian mounting pressure to persuade the Kyrgyz 
President Kurmanbek Bakiye to close American base in Manas. Especially, Russians wanted 
to silence the opposition which was against closing the base and tried to influence the 
president. Indeed, the Kyrgyzstan incident was the first case  where these attacks successfully 
realized the political aim which had been to persuade Kyrgyz authorities to close the 
American base.  
 
Conclusion 
 All attacks which took place between 2007 and 2009 had a lot of similarities: the 
political background is similar, the methods used by the aggressor are similar and also the 
hypothetical perpetrators are similar. There are also some differences like the main aims of 
attack and the result of it. However,  these three cases set examples of mass cyberattacks 
aimed at paralyzing structures of the states.  
 Firstly, the political background just before the attacks is similar. All three countries in 
that time had tensed relationship with Russia.  In case of Estonia in 2007 it was caused by 
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removal  of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn, in 2009 in Kyrygystan due to the heated debated 
about the future of Manas airbase. Ultimately, in case of Georgia it was a part of war but first 
time in a new domain – cyberspace. We clearly see that the cyberattacks carried out against 
these three former Soviet republics were done from political reasons.  
 The second interesting aspect is a technique of the attack. Here, we can notice 
similarities which can point out that the aggressor could be the same. However, the case of 
Georgia seems different and it was more sophisticated attack. The main tool of all attacks in 
all three cases were brute DDoS attack carried out firstly with using the massive botnet 
networks and later in case of Georgia and Estonia by patriotic hackers with using the earlier 
prepared tools. In case of Kyrygystan the patriotic hackers did not take part. The reason is that 
the attack on this Central Asia country was not so spectacular and did not gain the public 
support for this issue. The case of Georgia is slightly different. The attacks aimed at it were 
much more sophisticated and did not limit to the DDoS action mainly because it was a part of 
military campaign.  It also embraced  SQL injection attacks which could not be done by 
amateurs because it demands more advanced skills. 
 The third important point is the object of the attack. Here again we have a similar 
situation. In Georgia and Estonia the websites of government were disrupted, as well as the 
domains of banks and online newspapers. In case of Kyrgyzstan the attack was aimed at the 
providers on the Internet  - which are only 4 in this country As the consequence of hostile 
action majority of the Internet services collapsed. 
 The fourth conclusion is linked with the vulnerability of the countries. It seems that the 
more dependent states from the Internet are more sensible on the attacks from cyberspace. 
Estonian citizens life was temporally hampered when the majority of Kyrgyzstan people did 
not spot that they were under the attack. It was caused that Estonia is highly dependent on 
cyberspace when Kyrgyzstan is not. On the other hand, the more advantageous countries like 
Estonia had more resilient networks and could easier restore their systems when they were 
under the attack. What is more, the disruption of the whole Internet is very difficult due to the 
big number of Internet providers.        
 The fifth point is the effectiveness of the action. In Estonia and Georgia cases the 
aggressors did not achieve their political aims. Both countries and their societies seemed to be 
resistant to the cyberattacks and did not revoke their policy after the cyberattacks. The 
different situation happened in Kyrgyzstan, where the cyberattacks combined with the 
political pressure influenced the decision to close the United States base. However, ultimately 
it changed and Americans could stay longer but for much more higher renting price.    
 One of the most important aspects of all three cases is the perpetrator of them. The 
architecture of cyberspace would not allow to unambiguously state who was responsible for 
cyberattacks. The fact is that the majority of the attacks came from Russia. We can conclude 
three hypotheses about it.  
 The first hypothesis is based on the assumption that attacks were carried out by the 
amateur, Russian, patriotic hackers who wanted to carry out the cyberstrike in order to express 
their outrage on the policy of Estonia and Georgia. This hypothesis is low probable mainly 
because of the lack of technical skills of these hackers. During the attacks the advanced 
botnets consisted of thousands of computers were used. There are inaccessible for average 
users of the Internet. What is more, in Kyrgystan case the Russian social networks of hackers 
were not involved in. The first hypothesis seems less reliable.56 
 The second hypothesis assumed that attacks were carried out by the Russian 
cybercriminal groups on their own, especially by the Russian Business Networks. Using the  
advanced botnets in all three cases owned by Russian cybercriminals pointed out the 
engagement of Russian hackers.  These groups pursue mainly profits and money. It is hard to 
point out the potential financial benefits from attacking the Georgian, Estonian and Kirgiz 
websites and because of it these hypothesis also seems unreliable.57 
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 The third hypothesis lies on the assumption that Russian authorities hired 
cybercriminals from Russian Business Network to carry out strike against Estonia, Georgia 
and Kyrgyzstan. This thesis seems the most probable because of the following reasons. Russia 
wanted to punish these countries but could not especially in case of Estonia -  a NATO 
member - conduct the states sponsor offensive. So it was convenient to hire cybercrminals 
who carried the offensive campaign on behalf of Russian authorities.58 The second important 
aspect is a full control for Internet flow in Russia by the Russian authorities and such a big 
attack could not be noticed by them.59 
 To sum up, the cases of Estonia, Georgia and Kyrgystan present a three similar 
scenarios of massive cyberattacks against states. The similarities between them point out that 
the perpetrator was the same. These actions prove that the cyberthreats could not be 
underestimated and in the future the similar actions will take place even with a bigger success.  
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